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This article identifies the dynamics of the national security syndrome 
and the pendulum swing between security and liberalization that are 
embedded in the Turkish political system. It then explores how these 
are reflected in the problematic and conflictual processes of Turkish 
policy formulation with regard to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
in the post-violence era. The article presents evidence of a new impasse 
surrounding Turkey’s southeast/Kurdish question. While Turkey is 
having difficulties in designing post-terror policies, the PKK appears 
unprepared to fully disarm and give up. The only route remaining 
seems to be one of political struggle. After identifying Turkey’s struc-
tural limits to addressing the issue, the article discusses the implica-
tions of these on the future of the conflict, on Turkey’s foreign relations 
with the West, and on the increasingly torn domestic political situation. 
Introduction 
A LTHOUGH THE COMBAT STRATEGIES of organized armies have usually failed against ethnic insurgencies, Turkey has emerged from a 15-year struggle against the Kurdish PKK movement with a decisive 
military victory. Turkish security forces have succeeded in eliminating most of 
the PKK’s armed combatants and capturing the group’s leader, Abdullah  
Ocalan, leading to the retreat of virtually all remaining PKK units from Turk-
ish soil. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that a new, political strug-
gle between Turkey and the PKK, in its own way as intensive as the first, has 
only just begun. Even though this new phase is more political in nature, the 
primacy of security and threat perceptions seems to be continuing unabated, 
and the Turkish security establishment seems reluctant to relinquish man-
agement of the issue to the political circles. 
Several questions persist therefore: Does the military defeat mean that the 
Kurdish issue will now play a less pivotal role within Turkey’s foreign policy, 
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and will this allow Turkey to resume previous, more accommodating relations 
with its Middle Eastern neighbors? Does the PKK’s defeat make it easier for 
Turkey to meet the requirements for European Union accession? Has it proven 
possible to overcome an ethnic insurgency movement with a military victory? 
Can the military-led decisiveness of the Turkish political system and the 
overwhelmingly united national consensus during the military struggle con-
tinue to prevail in the era of political struggle? Though the Turkish army won 
the armed struggle, is it appropriate for the military to be fighting the political 
one? The answers to these questions seem to be largely ‘no’, the reasons for 
which are likely hidden in the historical foundations of the Turkish state struc-
ture, which was shaped between conflicting forces of political liberalization 
and security. The modern manifestation of this problematic can be traced in 
the emerging patterns of the conflict between Turkey and the various forms of 
political representation of Kurdish ethnic awareness. 
It has been argued that, throughout much of the history of the republic, one 
of the major domestic Turkish policies has been the containment of any poten-
tial political and cultural Kurdish movement.1 What the literature has  
neglected to identify is whether this policy has been a product of political cal-
culation or whether it represents a structural tendency of the Turkish political 
system.2 This article first identifies the dynamics of a national security syn-
drome that is embedded in the Turkish political system and then explores 
how this syndrome is reflected in the formulation of Turkish policies towards 
the Kurdish issue in the post-terror era. 
Defining the Liberalization–Security Pendulum 
Certain characteristics of Turkish history and politics long ago created an  
imbalanced pendulum between political liberalization and security needs. 
Liberalization attempts in Ottoman–Turkish history rarely took place in a vac-
uum, and the limiting borders for these attempts were largely determined by 
the overarching systemic primacy of internal and external security concerns. 
Several characteristics both emerged from and contributed to the persistence 
of this structural phenomenon. First, at a time of constant territorial contrac-
tion during the Ottoman era, pro-reform circles justified their political 
liberalization demands as being better able to protect the state/nation from ex-
ternal and internal threats. Security was the end, while political liberalization 
was seen as the means – an understanding that provides evidence of the long-
standing supremacy of security and stability demands.3 Second, there was a 
fear among the elite of uncontrolled power decentralization and its dangerous 
security implications. This worry was further provoked by a mistrust of ordi-
nary citizens, whom they feared might be empowered by any political reform.4 
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Third, the ruling elite that assumed the mission of promoting liberalizing re-
forms was ironically at the same time the group whose primary responsibility 
was to protect the country’s national security.5 At times of immediate threat, 
when the two identities clashed, the elite’s role as the professional security 
guards of the state and the regime would prevail, automatically spelling an 
end to liberal policies. 
On the other hand, later in the Republican era, once the homeland was liber-
ated and the ruling elite felt that they had guaranteed the more dominant side 
of the pendulum swing, namely, the security of the regime and the country, 
they themselves initiated further liberalization attempts. These now sparked 
true tests for the dilemma between liberalization and security. 
The first political liberalization attempt came in 1924 with the formation of 
the first opposition party, the Progressive and Republican Party (Terakki-
perver Cumhuriyet Firkasi). When the subsequent Kurdish-led Sheik Said  
Rebellion broke out in Turkey’s southeast, the existing government’s policies 
towards the rebellion were found by Ataturk and his friends to be overly soft.6 
Tougher policies were prescribed, and more hawkish figures to conduct them 
were sought. The initiation of emergency laws and tribunals in a highly secu-
ritized environment7 cost the life of the new party and put an end to this first 
attempt at multi-party politics. 
The second multi-party attempt, beginning with the founding of the Free 
Party (Serbest Firka) in 1930, also fell victim to concerns over regime and state 
security. The ensuing massive societal support for the new party made it clear 
that potential anti-regime elements were both plentiful and ready to take ad-
vantage of multi-party politics in their struggle against the state. The ruling 
elite’s fears of anarchy seemed to be materializing. Ataturk himself, despite 
the fact that he had initiated this liberalization attempt, was forced to sub-
scribe to the insecurity concerns, saying in a talk with an opposition party 
leader, ‘anarchy, there is anarchy everywhere. You [the opposition party lead-
ers] are oblivious or blind to this fact ... I can’t be impartial under these circum-
stances.’8 The new party was compelled to close itself down. A subsequent 
tragic incident, a religious rebellion referred to as the ‘Menemen Case’,9 in 
which an army officer was beheaded, sealed the final justification in the elite’s 
minds for the primacy of national security. To the elite, any form of power re-
location or diffusion to societal elements was determined to be fatal to the 
state and the regime owing to the fragmented nature of the society. These lib-
eralization failures consolidated a clear national security syndrome among the 
Turkish elite, which would play as the primary structural criterion for any 
type of future political liberalization attempt in Turkish domestic politics. 
This national security syndrome may explain why Turkey continues to have 
a difficult time in designing a post-terror political strategy towards the Kurd-
ish issue and the PKK. Replacing their guns with rhetoric, the two sides now 
appear more like chess players than fighting enemies in Turkey’s southeast 
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mountains. Ocalan and the PKK may be attempting with their calls for a de-
mocratic solution to turn military defeat into political victory, but Turkey 
seems to be preparing a full-fledged effort to halt any international political 
recognition – often referred to in Turkey as ‘politicization’ – of the PKK and 
the Kurdish issues. In other words, while Ocalan and the PKK attempt to dic-
tate the terms of reform using the threat of terror,10 Turkey seems to be adopt-
ing strategies to first eliminate the remaining terror threat and then proceed 
with democratization on its own terms. Turkey faces, however, a dilemma of 
transforming its current combat psychology while designing the post-terror 
strategy required for future admittance to the EU.  
Turkey’s Emerging Response 
Ocalan’s proposal of a so-called ‘democratic solution’ had successfully put the 
ball in Turkey’s court at the start. With the exhilarating atmosphere of possible 
European Union membership and the concomitant emphasis on the democra-
tization process, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem spoke positively about 
the prospect of introducing Kurdish television. Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, then 
minister in charge of human rights, organized meetings with NGOs domi-
nated by pro-Kurdish activists, and the influential Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) commissioned a report which recom-
mended culture- and language-based reforms. Nevertheless, a more cautious, 
wait-and-see attitude prevailed in the public sector. 
Neither Ocalan’s capture nor the proposals in his ‘democratic union mani-
festo’ generated a unified response from the Turkish state security establish-
ment, indicating that it had not yet finalized a post-conflict policy towards the 
PKK. This is not surprising, since Turkey had been primarily geared toward 
fighting the PKK on the battlefield. With the PKK’s shifting of emphasis to-
ward politics, however, there was likely concern that an early response would 
have been interpreted as dignifying the PKK’s new positioning. 
An unwelcome response, from Turkey’s standpoint, came from Europe, 
which made it clear that reforms on the Kurdish issue were essential before 
Turkey could become a European Union member. Visits to southeastern  
Turkey by European Union and EU member-state government officials 
boomed in early 2000, with some three hundred reported meetings taking 
place with Kurdish figures in the region, primarily members of Halkin  
Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP), Turkey’s only Kurdish-oriented political party.11 
These meetings should not have been unexpected, since reforming the Kurd-
ish issue would very soon be one of the backbones of Turkey’s route to joining 
Europe. Gunther Verheugen, the European Commissioner responsible for 
enlargement, said on one of his visits to Ankara that the Kurdish issue would 
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be a crucial part of the Accession Partnership Document that was being  
prepared to delineate the necessary steps for Turkey’s admission into the EU.12 
Early indications of Turkey’s response to Ocalan’s politicization attempt be-
gan in January 2000, when the Turkish High Broadcasting Authority shut 
down CNN-Turk, a 24-hour news channel, for one day owing to an anchor-
man’s questioning a guest on whether Ocalan would become ‘the next  
Mandela’. Only a few days later, the Turkish State Security courts revealed 
their decision about the leadership of the main legal Kurdish party (HADEP), 
sentencing 16 leading figures to three years and nine months imprisonment on 
the basis of charges that they had helped and followed orders from the PKK.13 
The state’s response became still clearer in a statement in mid-March from a 
member of the National Security Council, declaring that Turkey was unlikely 
in the near future to allow either education or broadcasting in Kurdish, on the 
grounds that these would ‘tear apart the mosaic’ of Turkey’s multi-ethnic so-
ciety.14 Then President Demirel echoed this sentiment a few days later when 
he said, ‘if we give Kurds free broadcasting and educational rights we will fall 
to pieces’.15  
Another of the Turkish state’s responses to what is viewed as evidence of the 
PKK’s politicization attempt was the detention of three Kurdish HADEP may-
ors on charges of supporting the PKK. These detentions, coming on the heels 
of the mayors’ meetings with European officials, were heavily criticized in 
Europe. Demirel responded that this was a criminal court case and therefore 
an internal Turkish matter,16 though the leader of the coalition party ANAP, 
Mesut Yilmaz, admitted that the government leadership was caught unaware, 
implying that the security establishment had acted on its own.17 The HADEP 
mayors were released after three days and reinstated in office, though their 
trials continue. Their quick reinstatement in office was partly due to appar-
ently increasing European pressure; however, it also suggests that their arrests 
and detentions were less a matter of law enforcement than one of the Turkish 
state sending a message to the PKK, to Europeans supportive of the PKK’s 
new strategy, and to other HADEP mayors and Kurdish political figures. 
With these arrests, the Turkish state establishment made a move against fur-
ther politicization of the Kurdish issue and sent a warning to HADEP to cut its 
links with the PKK and to resist seeking alliances in Europe. Turkey also re-
minded Europe that it still sees the Kurdish issue as an internal problem, even 
if EU membership is on the table. A former Turkish army officer and politician 
was reported as saying that, by dealing with HADEP and the Kurdish issue, 
the EU is ‘on the wrong path’.18 
Such an assessment was arguably not unfounded, since Ocalan’s political 
proposals have been largely unable to reach any audience except a European 
one. Only now do his political demands seem to be reaching Turkish officials 
via Turkey’s attempts to accede to the European Union. In fact, Europe’s de-
mands for minority rights in the Accession Partnership Document have served 
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to delineate more clearly the domestic fault lines between influential state ac-
tors in Turkey. Those parties in favor of a political response, holding tight to 
the justification of entering the European Union, have declared that recogniz-
ing some Kurdish rights is a ‘must’19 or at least something to be considered.20 
The army-led anti-political-response front, on the other hand, has not backed 
down from its negative position, though it tries to not appear completely 
opposed to EU accession, which has the overall support of most Turkish 
people. The army has nevertheless declared on several occasions that it is 
against the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights. Its strongest ally has ap-
peared to be the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), whose leader has ex-
pressed his clear opposition to particular Kurdish rights, saying that this 
would lead to further separatist tendencies and conflictual developments.21 
The Speaker of the Parliament, also an MHP member, has said that the de-
mands for Kurdish rights in the Accession Partnership Document were more 
damaging than the Sèvres Agreement, which sought to divide Ottoman 
lands in the 1920s.22 Yet another MHP politician revealed the bottom line of 
his party’s stance on the issue when he announced that they were against it 
‘all the way’, because they could not allow the use of state resources to ‘arti-
ficially create a language and a nation’.23 
A surprise ally for those in favor of a political response appeared as the di-
rector of the National Intelligence Organization announced that Kurdish tele-
vision and education might in fact help the state to better manage problems in 
Turkey’s southeast, since more than half of all Kurdish mothers in the region 
do not speak Turkish. He further implied that the army had a similar under-
standing.24 In the next National Security Council meeting, however, the army 
generals stipulated clearly that the army did ‘not share the thoughts of the in-
telligence director’ and added that such rights would be against the unitary 
character of the Turkish state. At the same time, a former navy commander 
stated publicly that Kurdish television broadcasting would not create a prob-
lem for Turkey.25 The Supreme Court Chief Justice also declared that ‘some 
amount of Kurdish television’ could be allowed,26 and the Foreign Ministry, 
under the leadership of Ismail Cem,27 continued its general support for Kurd-
ish rights. The hardliner front gained the perhaps unexpected support at this 
time of the Turkish High Education Council, which issued a statement saying 
it opposed Kurdish television and education for similar reasons to those out-
lined earlier by the army. Clearly, at this stage, the Turkish state and govern-
ment apparatus appeared very torn on the issue.28 
Feeling surrounded and pressured to a degree rarely experienced in Turkish 
politics, the army opted to reiterate its stance on the Kurdish issue, but this 
time at a very sensitive juncture. At the exact moment when Turkish Prime 
Minister Ecevit was attempting to show Turkey’s complete will to be a full EU 
candidate member through his attendance at and participation in the EU 
Summit in Nice, Turkish news agencies released a report that had been passed 
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to them by the Chief of Staff’s General Secretary. In this report, ‘Evaluation of 
Internal Security Operations in 2000’, the army clearly labels Kurdish televi-
sion and education demands as the ‘second dimension of separatist terrorism’ 
and the ‘revival and restructuring of the separatist movement through politi-
cal means’.29 After stranding the prime minister in this difficult position while 
abroad, the army refused to let up. Chief of Staff Kivrikoglu then visited  
Ecevit the following week, just prior to the coalition leaders’ summit to design 
the outlines of Turkey’s national program for EU accession, and again clearly 
indicated the army’s opposition to Kurdish cultural rights and to the political 
strategies of the separatist movement. After this visit, Ecevit, though avoiding 
direct mention of his ideas on Kurdish television and broadcasting, seemed to 
show his agreement with the army’s position that the PKK’s politicization 
process constituted a genuine security concern for Turkey, particularly in light 
of the support being given to the process by the Europeans.30 At the subse-
quent leaders’ summit, no decision on the issue was taken. 
Volkan Vural, director of the newly established EU General Secretariat in 
Ankara, added his voice by pointing out that cultural rights are a clear and 
undisputed EU demand. Nevertheless, at the 22 December National Security 
Council meeting, the army once again argued that Kurdish cultural rights are 
a tactic of separatist terrorism, making it clear that Turkey will not respond to 
such demands in the national program – at least not in the near future.31 The 
hardliners appear to have won this brief and unusual struggle within the 
Turkish state structure; Turkey appears unprepared to respond to any type of 
political representation of Kurdish politics. 
Understanding Turkey’s Emerging Response 
Another modern characterization of the national security syndrome outlined 
earlier is the country’s enormous sensitivity about national unity. This sensi-
tivity is continuously fed by the fear of being divided, which, as mentioned in 
note 5, has sometimes been labeled as Turkey’s ‘Sèvres Syndrome’. This fear is 
very deeply rooted both among public officials and in the society at large; 
therefore, any argument or movement which carries a separatist potential is 
readily seen as dangerous and subversive. Governmental and societal reflexes 
are quick to react against divisive threats. The four following reflections of the 
previously identified national security syndrome must be considered as the 
major factors supporting Turkey’s emerging tough stance against the PKK’s 
recent political moves. 
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Fears of Politicization and the IRA/Sinn Fein Model 
Notwithstanding Ocalan’s and the PKK’s pronouncements, the Turkish state 
establishment remains convinced that the PKK exists to divide Turkey. On 3 
February 2000, the Secretary General of the National Security Council spoke of 
the ‘PKK’s true goal of carving out a separate state’,32 and Prime Minister  
Ecevit was quoted as saying that the PKK’s politicization attempts are the real 
danger Turkey faces – implying that the PKK’s tactics may have changed, but 
the goals remain the same.33 Some PKK statements may be contributing to this 
fear. PKK central committee member Murat Karayilan said at the end of 
March 1999 that not only the language and culture but also Kurdish politics 
will be distinct,34 presumably implying the need for Kurdish-based political 
representation. Abdullah Ocalan’s brother, Osman Ocalan, was also reported 
in intelligence report excerpts as saying that Kurdish television and education 
were seen as a way to a more integrated Kurdish nation, the mobilizing power 
for the future independent state.35 This emphasis on political rights not only 
undercuts Ocalan’s promises of dropping political autonomy arguments, but 
also further provokes doubts about the sincerity of the PKK’s new, ostensibly 
more limited goals. These doubts are deepened by reports of the PKK’s arm-
ing and training four to five thousand men to use as a bargaining chip in their 
struggle for political recognition. The PKK’s policies of withdrawing from 
Turkey but failing to give up their weaponry may suggest to the Turkish state 
the possible emergence of a future IRA/Sinn Fein structure – an armed wing 
being used by the political leadership in order to force their terms. Some Turk-
ish career security officials claim that apparent splinter groups that have con-
tinued to fight despite Ocalan’s importuning are not actually acting outside of 
PKK control. These groups are therefore considered by the Turkish establish-
ment as part of the PKK’s bargaining strategies.36  
The Turkish security bureaucracy seems convinced that Turkey is facing the 
challenge of a process of increasing political recognition of the Kurdish sepa-
ratist movement, which is basically the ‘second period’ of the separatist terror 
they have been fighting against. They believe that the PKK, having failed to 
gain political recognition and popularity through its military struggle, now 
hopes to gain it through ‘innocent’-looking political strategies, such as adding 
power to Turkey’s southeast municipal administrations where the Kurdish 
party HADEP is already in control and establishing cultural rights to Kurdish 
education and television broadcasting, which it is assumed would reduce the 
problematic impacts of Kurdish society’s heterogeneity. The army clearly sees 
these efforts as part of a political war being waged by the PKK and defines 
them as attempts to develop a political separatist movement based on ethnic 
nationalism.37 This is clearly seen as detrimental to national security, as was 
the PKK’s earlier strategy of armed conflict. 
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Thus, according to the Turkish armed forces, the terror and security threat is 
not yet over, but has merely entered a new phase. In this phase, the military is 
determined to do ‘everything necessary to eradicate this new type of threat’, 
and has stated that the ‘struggle will last until the last terrorist is eliminated’.38 
The army’s understanding is that the fight should continue until the end, be-
cause the ‘PKK is determined to use its armed constituents as an umbrella for 
its efforts to get political recognition’ and, ‘unfortunately, some foreign and 
domestic circles are falling into this trap’.39  
In the political sphere, there seems to be increasing acceptance of the army’s 
stance, with the MHP’s support and recently even the prime minister’s decla-
ration of sharing the military’s concerns about the politicization process and 
about European support of the PKK.40 The army’s unyielding positioning and 
its determining weight in Turkish domestic politics – particularly vis-à-vis  
national security affairs – is a clear indication that the struggle between  
Turkey and the PKK will continue within new parameters. 
The Economic Diagnosis 
The second major factor which eases Turkey’s dismissal of any political or cul-
ture-based arguments is the traditional understanding that the southeastern or 
Kurdish question is primarily a problem based on economic issues or poverty. 
In this widely popular view, eliminating poverty would eliminate the PKK, 
since the PKK’s fighting ranks are peopled strictly by those with no economic 
alternatives. Prime Minister Ecevit has been a traditional supporter of this 
view and has proposed the continuation of the current security-based regional 
governorship for the purpose of dealing with ‘economic and social’ factors.41 
Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu also proposed the establishment of an  
undersecretariat responsible for addressing economic problems in the re-
gion.42 Finally, former Turkish ambassador to the USA and much-consulted 
‘wiseman’ to the Turkish state establishment Sukru Elekdag also pointed out 
that an ‘economic master plan’ for the southeast region was urgently needed 
in order to ‘change the nature of the region which produces the human mate-
rial for terror’.43 Supporting this interpretation is the observation that the 
nearly 60% of Kurds who live outside Turkey’s southeast region are very 
much integrated into the socioeconomic structure of Turkey and are not, by 
and large, strong supporters of the PKK. 
Accordingly, a new ‘master action plan’ has been put into effect. This plan 
was designed by the National Security Council Secretariat, upon the Council’s 
recommendation to the government, and came into force with Prime Minster 
Ecevit’s signature on 7 May 2000. Even though the details of the plan were 
never shared with the public, it is known to consist of 107 items for the im-
provement of economic conditions in Turkey’s southeast region, such as pro-
moting public education and health services.44 The limited role of civilians and 
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the political sphere during the preparation and implementation of the plan 
has created doubts among some over whether it was fully supported by every 
political party in the coalition government.45 A major part of the infra-
structural restructuring in the former conflict region of Turkey has been car-
ried out under the de facto supervision of the armed forces. It has been  
reported that military troops are rebuilding bridges, schools and even villages, 
and that the civilian authorities are trying to provide ‘logistical’ support to 
them.46 The army even plays Ricky Martin music for the local youth, and in 
most ways seems to be playing the primary role in the region’s redevelop-
ment. Ultimately, these developments and the lack of political input into the 
process feed into the larger understanding that only an economic diagnosis of 
the problem is accurate and that economic investment should be the prescrip-
tion.47  
Of course, there are challenges to an economic understanding and to eco-
nomic endeavors. First, it is far from proven theoretically that economic  
developments will silence the political/cultural demands of the emerging 
Kurdish politics. The unreliability of an economic solution is even greater in 
the wake of such a long and confrontational experience, which may very well 
have increased ethnic and political awareness among the Kurds. Second, sev-
eral economic packages have emerged in the past out of this understanding 
and have sought to address the problems in the southeast. None of these were 
fully implemented, and so it remains unclear whether they would have had 
the intended results. Moreover, the economic crisis of early 2001, the worst in 
Turkish history, has left the country with minimized capacities to launch and 
implement new radical economic packages – not only in the southeast but 
over the entire country – a limitation that will not soon disappear. 
Mistrust in European Objectives 
The third factor at play here is Turkey’s traditional mistrust of European  
objectives in the Kurdish issue. This mistrust continues in spite of Turkey’s 
improved chances for EU membership and has been further strengthened by 
the European rush to reach out to HADEP as the party seen to be carrying out 
Ocalan’s ‘democratic struggle’ strategy. An understanding may be gaining 
strength in Turkey that Europe is using the EU membership ‘carrot’ in order 
to facilitate political solutions to the Kurdish issue. Some analyses have ap-
peared that suggest that the road map for full European Union membership 
might in fact be a road map for a political solution to the Kurdish question. 
Providing evidence for these concerns, Professor Bakir Caglar, a former judge 
in the European Court of Human Rights, has pointed out specific references 
within European Union documents to a ‘civilian solution’ to the southeast 
question, to the protection of ‘minority rights’, and to the ‘protection of minor-
ity languages’, in particular Kurdish.48  
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This identification of the politicization of the Kurdish question with full 
membership in the EU was further consolidated in people’s minds after a 
much-quoted speech in which coalition leader Mesut Yilmaz stated that ‘the 
road to the EU goes through Diyarbakir’,49 the largest city at the center of the 
Kurdish-majority region of Turkey. Former Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz 
Soysal also captured this concern with his reference to the ‘EU’s Kurdish 
card’.50 The perception of EU manipulation of the Kurdish issue increased 
once the clearly detailed conditions of full EU membership were made public. 
While there were several other points among the European demands within 
the Accession Partnership Document, the ones about the Kurdish issue 
grabbed the lion’s share of the attention. Turkish hardliners in particular saw a 
parallel between the existing PKK demands and the European requests. On  
1 December 2000, the Turkish army released a report emphasizing this overlap 
and named several European countries as supporters of the PKK’s politiciza-
tion tactics. This report implies that Europe can be considered a major part of 
an international conspiracy against Turkish unity.51 This report cannot easily 
be seen as an isolated perception or understanding, since a large portion of 
Turkish public opinion seems inclined to share these concerns. On 3 December 
2000, for example, nearly every major newspaper allocated its headlines to an 
incident that took place within the European Union bureaucracy. It was re-
ported that the Chief of the Turkish Desk in the EU sent an official letter to the 
PKK Central Committee and later claimed it was done by mistake.52 Many 
Turkish journalists and members of the general public seemed to view this as 
the long-awaited evidence of an EU–PKK link.53 In the following days, Prime 
Minister Ecevit’s statements were released confirming Turkey’s mistrust of the 
European agenda and its suspicions of European support for the PKK and its 
strategies, while Deputy Prime Minister Bahceli stated that he did not find 
Europe ‘sincere’ vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue.54  
The EU accession process may already be poisoned by the Kurdish issue and 
its European link. Turkey’s perceptions and concerns about the PKK’s new  
political strategies seem to be taking the upper hand and superceding even the 
EU integration issue itself. 
The Dilemma of Kurdish Politics 
A fourth reason behind the Turkish state’s positioning could stem from the ex-
treme problems legal Kurdish political movements in Turkey face in divorcing 
themselves from the PKK, thereby making it difficult for Turkey to find a fully 
non-PKK partner for dialogue.55 Politicians who attempt to appeal to Kurdish 
votes in the southeastern cities are partly dependent on constituents who are 
PKK sympathizers, since this group is more assertive and organized than the 
group’s opponents. This is true not only for Kurdish parties like HADEP, but 
also for Kurdish deputies from other parties. Some Kurdish members of the 
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Islamist Virtue Party have renounced their party membership, citing the 
party’s tough stance on Ocalan’s execution. This suggests that the PKK’s con-
cerns are becoming a significant part of Kurdish politics, further complicating 
the state’s ability to recognize an acceptable political movement with Kurdish 
representation in it. 
It seems as if the pro-Kurdish party HADEP’s efforts to become a normal  
political party rather than one perceived as being controlled by pro-PKK ele-
ments remain primarily rhetorical. In their November 2000 convention, for  
example, the party administration was touted as having been renewed to in-
clude former members of other Turkish parties, such as Anavatan Partisi 
(ANAP) and Refah Partisi (RP), and stump speeches emphasized HADEP’s 
lack of a separatist agenda. Nevertheless, actions on the convention floor – 
such as protesting the Turkish flag, preventing the Turkish national anthem 
from being played, and, in particular, electing a chairman against whom there 
are outstanding charges of having aided the PKK – are perceived by much of 
the Turkish population as indicating continued PKK influence over the party, 
and therefore unreliability.56 Prime Minister Ecevit also referred to the conven-
tion crowd’s behavior as evidence of a continuing PKK threat.57 Obviously, the 
dilemma that non-PKK-involved Kurdish policies seem unable to emerge 
strongly in Turkey forces the Turkish state and the political elite to opt for a 
general rejectionist behavior towards any type of Kurdish political representa-
tion, and this has obviously complicated the incorporation of ethnically con-
scious Kurdish political representation into the Turkish political space. 
Implications 
It is possible then to speak of a new impasse and a resurfacing of the ‘imbro-
glio’ surrounding Turkey’s southeast/Kurdish question. Turkey is having dif-
ficulties in designing post-terror policies and is therefore resorting to the tradi-
tional economic understanding of the issue. On the other side, the PKK seems 
unprepared and unwilling to fully disarm and surrender, even though it 
seems now impossible to defeat the Turkish army. The only route remaining is 
one of political struggle, and this is the new format of the war between Turkey 
and the PKK.  
The PKK’s inevitable resorting to political and diplomatic means to reach its 
goals and the subsequent increasingly strong perception on the Turkish side 
that this constitutes a ‘second phase’ of Kurdish separatist terrorism clearly 
mean that the conflict between the parties is far from over. While European 
involvement in the Kurdish issue is also inevitable owing to the Europeaniza-
tion of the Kurdish issue via the Kurdish diaspora, this serves as a constant 
provocation to Turkish suspicions that Europe seeks a divided Turkey. In  
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addition, the domestic dominance of a traditional economic diagnosis and 
prescription for the Kurdish issue in Turkey leads to an environment of avoid-
ance and diversion in which the other dimensions of the issue become 
overshadowed.58 Finally, the difficulties of creating a non-PKK-dominated 
Kurdish political representation further strengthens Turkish hardliners’ posi-
tion that the separatist terror is not over and that the state must remain on 
constant alert. 
Three major implications might emerge out of this environment. First, this 
may signal a return to combat with different patterns, but without the elimina-
tion of violence, along the lines of the IRA/Sinn Fein structure. As long as the 
armed units of the PKK are used or perceived as bargaining/blackmailing 
elements, Turkey will feel forced to conduct operations – even cross-border 
ones – to eliminate these units. There is the possibility, therefore, that the con-
flict level in Turkey may rise again, leading to instability both at home and in 
the region owing to the transnational character of the issue. 
The second implication of the new pattern of conflict may concern Turkey’s 
foreign relations with the West. It is not a new phenomenon for Turkish for-
eign policymakers to be constrained by the international linkages of the Kurd-
ish issue. Now that the political recognition of the Kurdish issue is becoming 
the main emphasis of Kurdish elements, particularly those within the Kurdish 
diaspora, Turkey is likely to face mounting pressure over the issue. In the 
past, the PKK’s terrorist activities made it relatively easy for Turkey to con-
demn and dismiss international interest in the issue. Now, however, the  
political recognition of an organization presenting itself as acting on behalf of 
minority rights based on standard rights recognized in the West will make it 
difficult for Turkey to easily defend its positioning. Even countries outside the 
region may have interests in the political recognition of the PKK and Turkey’s 
Kurdish issue. The problem for Turkey’s foreign policy towards the West, 
therefore, is the emerging divide between the latter’s interpretation of minor-
ity rights and Turkey’s political organizational principles on this issue.  
The third possible implication embraces the structure of Turkish domestic 
politics. The civilian political forces have so far been unable to take the initia-
tive and tackle the post-terror era of the southeast question with plans for  
addressing the social, economic, and cultural needs of southeast Turkey. Since 
the failure to adequately challenge the PKK’s new moves continues, the Turk-
ish security establishment, which is designed to defeat the PKK under combat 
conditions, is certain to continue to take action. A continuing larger role for 
the army vis-à-vis this issue may keep the country’s political structure unbal-
anced in terms of civil–military relations – already a concern for the EU acces-
sion process. In combating the new political nature of this problem, it is the 
political elite and civilian bureaucrats who must be at the forefront of the 
struggle. At the same time, mistrust of European intentions will complicate 
any formulation of civilian-led strategies, especially on the issue of Kurdish 
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political rights. This may in turn poison possible major progress in Turkish–
EU relations. 
This article has shown that there are structural limits to Turkey’s ability to 
address the Kurdish issue in a manner acceptable to the Europeans. The Euro-
peans should, therefore, pay greater attention to Turkey’s national security 
syndrome, which is the hub of these limits. Addressing the needs of Turkey’s 
security perceptions directly and, perhaps more importantly, providing secu-
rity assurances to Turkey will perhaps help Turks overcome their national se-
curity syndrome and lead to more satisfying developments in terms of both 
the Kurdish issue and Turkish–EU relations. 
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